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MEADOR LECTURE SERIES 2004-2005:
RISK AND THE LAW

PRECAUTIONS AGAINST WHAT? THE AVAILABILITY
HEURISTIC AND CROSS-CULTURAL RISK PERCEPTION

Cass R. Sunstein*
ABSTRACT
Because risks are on all sides of social situations,it is not possible to be
globally "precautionary." Hence, the Precautionary Principle runs into
serious conceptual difficulties; any precautions will themselves create hazards of one kind or another. When the principle gives guidance, it is often
because of the availabilityheuristic, which can make some risks stand out
as particularlysalient, regardlessof their actual magnitude. The same heuristic helps to explain differences across groups, cultures, and even nations
in the perception of risks, especially when linked with such social processes
as cascades and group polarization.One difficulty is that what is available
is sometimes a result of predispositions,cultural and otherwise. There are
complex links among availability,social processes for the spreading of information, and predispositions.
Many Germans believe that drinking water after eating cherries is
deadly; they also believe that putting ice in soft drinks is unhealthy.
The English, however, rather enjoy a cool drink of water after some
cherries, and Americans love icy refreshments.'

*
Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor, Law School and Department of Political
Science, University of Chicago.
1.
Joseph Henrich et al., Group Report: What is the Role of Culture in Bounded Rationality?, in
BOUNDED RATIONALITY: THE ADAPTIVE TOOLBOX 343, 353 (Gerd Gigerenzer & Reinhard Selten eds.,
2001). See id. at 353-54 (providing an entertaining outline in connection with food choice decisions).

HeinOnline -- 57 Ala. L. Rev. 75 2005-2006

Alabama Law Review

(Vol. 57:1:75

The most important factor contributing to the increased stringency of health, safety and environmental regulation in Europe has
been a series of regulatory failures and crises that placed new regulatory issues on the political agenda and pressured policy makers to
adopt more risk averse or precautionary policies....

The regulatory failure associated with BSE significantly affected
the attitude of the European public towards GM foods....

...Consumer and environmental regulations are likely to become
more innovative, comprehensive and risk averse as a response to a
widespread public perception of regulatory failures.2
It has become standard to say that, with respect to risks, Europe and the
United States can be distinguished along a single axis: Europe accepts the
Precautionary Principle, and the United States does not.3 On this view,
Europeans attempt to build a "margin of safety" 4 into public decisions, taking care to protect citizens against risks that cannot be established with certainty.5 By contrast, Americans are reluctant to take precautions, requiring
clear evidence of harm in order to justify regulation. 6 These claims seem
plausible in light of the fact that the United States appears comparatively
unconcerned about the risks associated with global warming and the genetic
modification of food; in those contexts, Europeans favor precautions,
whereas Americans seem to require something akin to proof of danger.7 To
be sure, the matter is quite different in the context of threats to national security. For the war in Iraq, the United States (and England) followed a kind
of Precautionary Principle, whereas other nations (most notably France and
Germany) wanted clearer proof of danger. But for most threats to safety and
health, many people believe that Europe is precautionary and the United
States is not.8
2.

David Vogel, The Hare and the Tortoise Revisited: The New Politics of Consumer and Envi-

ronmental Regulation in Europe, 33 BRIT.J. POL. ScI. 557, 568-69, 580 (2003).

3.

On some of the complexities here, see John S. Applegate, The PrecautionaryPreference: An

American Perspective on the PrecautionaryPrinciple, 6 HuM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 413

(2000), and Peter H. Sand, The Precautionary Principle: A European Perspective, 6 HUM. &
ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 445 (2000).

4.
Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the PrecautionaryPrinciple, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1013 (2003)
(quoting Thomas Lundmark, Principlesand Instruments of German Environmental Law, 4 J. ENVTL. L.
& PRAC. 43, 44 (1997)) [hereinafter Beyond the PrecautionaryPrinciple].
5.
See Applegate, supra note 3, at 424-26.
6. Id.at417.
7.
See Beyond the PrecautionaryPrinciple,supra note 4,at1015-17.
8. See John D. Graham, The Perilsof the PrecautionaryPrinciple:Lessons from the American and
EuropeanExperience, Address before the Heritage Foundation (Oct. 20, 2003), in HERITAGE LECTURES,
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But as others have demonstrated, this opposition between Europe and
America is false, even illusory. 9 It is simply wrong to say that Europeans are
more precautionary than Americans. As an empirical matter, neither is
"more precautionary."'() Europeans are not more averse to risks than Americans.' 1 They are more averse to particular risks, such as the risks associated
with global warming, but Americans have their own preoccupations as
well.12 My larger point, a central claim of this Lecture, is conceptual. No
nation can, even in principle, commit itself to precaution as such. 13 The real
problem with the Precautionary Principle, at least in its strongest form, is
that it is incoherent; it purports to give guidance, but it fails to do so because
it condemns the very steps that it requires. Was the war in Iraq precautionary? Is it precautionary to ban cellular telephones, nuclear power plants,
genetically modified food, and airplanes? These questions should be enough
to suggest that precautions always give rise to risks of their own.
Nations can regard themselves as "precautionary" only if they blind
themselves to many aspects of risk-related situations and focus on a narrow
subset of what is at stake. This kind of self-blinding is what makes the Precautionary Principle seem to give guidance, and I shall have a fair bit to say
about why people and societies are selective in their fears. My major hypothesis is that the availabilityheuristic is often the source of people's fears
about certain risks.14 If a particular incident is cognitively "available"-both
vivid and salient-then people will have a heightened fear of the risk in
question. If people in one nation fear the risks associated with terrorism, and
people in another nation fear the risks associated with mad cow disease, the
availability heuristic is likely to be the reason. Hence, with respect to application of the Precautionary Principle, cultural differences are often rooted in
availability. But this point misses some complexities, about both social influences and cultural predispositions. I shall turn to these in due course. The
availability heuristic does not operate in a social or cultural vacuum.
In short, I aim to show both that the Precautionary Principle is not quite
what it seems and that its operation is underwritten by an identifiable heuJan. 15, 2004, at 1, 1-2, available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Regulation/loader.cfm?url=/
commonspot/security/getfile.cfm&PagelD=54513.
9.
See Jonathan B. Wiener, Precaution, Risk, and Multiplicity (2004) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the author); see also Jonathan B. Wiener & Michael D. Rogers, Comparing Precaution in the
United States and Europe, 5 J. RISK RES. 317, 319 (2002).
10. Weiner & Rogers, supra note 9, at 318.
11.
Id. at 342.
12.
For many examples in the context of health, safety, and the environment, see Vogel, supra note
2.

13.
See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2005); see
also Beyond the PrecautionaryPrinciple,supra note 4.
14.

Undoubtedly, a great deal can be learned from use of the psychometric paradigm. See, e.g.,

Ortwin Renn & Bernd Rorhmann, Risk Perception Research: An Introduction, in CROSS-CULTURAL
RISK PERCEPTION: A SURVEY OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES 11, 17-18 (Ortwin Renn & Bernd Rorhmann eds.,
2000), 13 TECHNOLOGY, RISK, AND SOCIETY: AN INTERNATIONAL SERIES IN RISK ANALYSIS (Jeryl

Mumpower & Ortwin Renn eds). I stress the availability heuristic here because of its comparative simplicity, but the heuristic interacts in complex ways with psychometrics and with culture.
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ristic with social and cultural foundations. The result is a hypothesis to the
effect that cross-cultural differences in both risk perception and in precautions are produced, in large part, by availability. I shall not be able to prove
that hypothesis in this space, but I hope to be able to say enough to prove
the hypothesis is plausible, illuminating, and worth further exploration.
WEAK AND STRONG

Begin with the Precautionary Principle. 15 There are twenty or more
definitions, and they are not compatible with one another. 16 We can imagine
a continuum of understandings. At one extreme are weak versions to which
no reasonable person could object. 17 At the other extreme are strong versions that would require a fundamental rethinking of regulatory policy.18
The most cautious and weak versions suggest, quite sensibly, that a lack
of decisive evidence of harm should not be a ground for refusing to regulate. 19 Controls might be justified even if we cannot establish a definite connection between, for example, low-level exposures to certain carcinogens
and adverse effects on human health. 20 Thus, the 1992 Rio Declaration
states: "Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of
full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing costeffective measures to prevent environmental degradation., 21 The Ministerial
Declaration of the Second International Conference on the Protection of the
North Sea, held in London in 1987, is in the same vein: "Accepting that in
order to protect the North Sea from possibly damaging effects of the most
dangerous substances, a precautionary approach is necessary which may
require action to control inputs of such substances even before a causal link
has been established by absolutely clear scientific evidence., 22 Similarly,
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change offers cautious language:
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of
full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such [regulatory] measures, taking into account that policies and

15.

This and the following sections draw extensively from Beyond the PrecautionaryPrinciple,

supra note 4, and SUNSTEIN, supra note 13.
16.
See Julian Morris, Defining the Precautionary Principle, in RETHINKING RISK AND THE

PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 1 (Julian Morris ed., 2000); Weiner, supra note 9.
17.
See Beyond the PrecautionaryPrinciple,supra note 4, at 1012.
18.
Id.
19.
Id.
20.
Id.
21.
BiORN LOMBORG, THE SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST 348 (2001).
22.
Morris, supra note 16, at 3 (quoting SECOND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE
PROTECTION OF THE NORTH SEA: MINISTERIAL DECLARATION CALLING FOR REDUCTION OF
POLLUTION, Nov. 25, 1987, art. VII, 27 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 835, 838 (1988)).
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measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective
so as
23
to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost.
The widely publicized Wingspread Declaration, from a meeting of environmentalists in 1998, goes somewhat further: "When an activity raises
threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures
should be taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not established scientifically. In this context the proponent of the activity, rather than
the public, should bear the burden of proof., 24 The first sentence just quoted
is more aggressive than the Rio Declaration because it is not limited to
threats of serious or irreversible damage. And in reversing the burden of
proof, the second sentence goes further still. Of course, everything depends
on what those with the burden of proof must show in particular.
In Europe, the Precautionary Principle is sometimes understood in a still
stronger way, suggesting that it is important to build "a margin of safety
into all decision making. 25 According to one definition, the Precautionary
Principle means "that action should be taken to correct a problem as soon as
there is evidence that harm may occur, not after the harm has already occurred. 26 The word "may" is the crucial one here. In a comparably strong
version, it is said that
the [P]recautionary [P]rinciple mandates that when there is a risk of
significant health or environmental damage to others or to future
generations, and when there is scientific uncertainty as to the nature
of that damage or the likelihood of the risk, then decisions should
be made so as to prevent such activities from being conducted
unless 27and until scientific evidence shows that the damage will not
occur.

The words "will not occur" seem to require proponents of an activity to
demonstrate that there is no risk at all, often an impossible burden to meet.
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Di23.
INDUR GOKLANY, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 6 (2001) (quoting U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 3.3 (May 9, 1992), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/ docs/ convkp/
conveng.pdf),
24.
Id. at 2. For an explanation of the Wingspread Declaration, see Peter Montague, The Precautionary Principle, Rachel's Env't & Health Wkly., Feb. 19, 1998, available at http://www
.monitor.net/rachellr586.html. A strong version is defended in Carolyn Raffensperger & Peter L. deFur,
Implementing the PrecautionaryPrinciple:Rigorous Science and Solid Ethics, 5 HUM. & ECOLOGICAL
RISK ASSESSMENT 933, 934 (1999).
25.
See LOMBORG, supra note 21, at 349 (quoting Lundmark, supra note 4, at 44).
26.
SONOMA COUNTY WASTE MANAGEMENT AGENCY, SONOMA COUNTY COUNTYWIDE

INTEGRATED WASTE MANAGEMENT PLAN app. a (2003), available at http://www.recyclenow.org (follow "reports" hyperlink to; then follow "Sonoma County Countywide Integrated Waste Management
Plan: Appendix A" hyperlink).
27.

LHHS Stem Cell/Cloning: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Labor, Health and Human Serv.

of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 107th Cong. 3 (2002) (testimony of Dr. Brent Blackwelder, President, Friends of the Earth).
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versity, adopted in 2000, appears to embrace a strong version as well. 28 The
Final Declaration of the First European "Seas At Risk Conference" says that
"if the 'worst case scenario' for a certain activity is serious enough then
even a small amount29of doubt as to the safety of that activity is sufficient to
stop it taking place."
SAFE AND SORRY?

The weak versions of the Precautionary Principle are unobjectionable
and important. Every day, individuals and nations take steps to avoid hazards that are far from certain.3 ° We do not walk in moderately dangerous
areas at night; we exercise; we buy smoke detectors; we buckle our seatbelts; we might even avoid fatty foods (or carbohydrates). 31 Sensible governments regulate risks that, in individual cases or even in the aggregate,
have well under a 100% chance of coming to fruition.32 An individual might
ignore a mortality risk of 1/500,000 because that risk is quite small, but if
33
100 million citizens face that risk, the nation had better take it seriously.
With respect to the weak version of the Precautionary Principle, there are
significant cross-cultural variations, but no serious person rejects that version.
For the moment, let us understand the principle in a strong way, to suggest that regulation is required whenever there is a possible risk to health,
safety, or the environment, even if the supporting evidence remains speculative, and even if the economic costs of regulation are high. To avoid absurdity, the idea of "possible risk" will be understood to require a certain threshold of scientific plausibility.3 4 To support regulation, no one thinks that it is
enough if someone, somewhere, urges that a risk is worth taking seriously.
But under the Precautionary Principle, as I understand it, the threshold burden is minimal, and once it is met, there is something like a presumption in
favor of regulatory controls. This version, as we shall see, helps to clarify a
significant problem with the idea of precaution and also to illuminate the
existence of cross-national differences.
WHY THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IS PARALYZING

Why might the Precautionary Principle, understood in its strong sense,
have such widespread appeal? At first glance, the answer is simple, for the
28.
See GOKLANY, supra note 23, at 6.
29.
Chris W. Backes & Jonathan M. Verschuuren, The PrecautionaryPrinciple in International,
European, and Dutch Wildlife Law, 9 Colo. J. Int'l Envtl. L. & Pol'y 43, 56 (1998) (quoting SEAS AT
RISK, The Final Declarationof the First European SEAS AT RISK Conference (1994), available at the
Common Wadden Sea Secretariat, Virchowstrabe 1, D-26382 Wilhelmshaven, Germany).
30.
See Beyond the PrecautionaryPrinciple,supra note 4, at 1016.
31.
Id.
32.
Id.
33.
Id.
34.
Id.
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principle contains some important truth. Certainly, we should acknowledge
that a small probability (say, 1 in 25,000) of a serious harm (say, 1,000,000
deaths) deserves extremely serious attention. It is worthwhile to spend a lot
of money to eliminate that risk. An economically oriented critic might observe that our resources are limited and that if we spend large amounts of
resources on highly speculative harms, we will not be allocating those resources wisely.35 In fact, this is the simplest criticism of the Precautionary
Principle.36 If we take costly steps to address all risks, however improbable
they are, we will quickly impoverish ourselves. 37 On this view, the Precautionary Principle "would make for a dim future., 38 It would also eliminate
technologies and strategies that make human lives easier, more convenient,
healthier, and longer.39
But there is something both odd and revealing about these claims. The
Precautionary Principle is designed to decrease morbidity and mortality;
how could it possibly make the future "dim"? I suggest that the real problem
with the principle is that it offers no guidance-not that it is wrong, but that
it forbids all courses of action, including regulation. Taken seriously, it bans
the very steps that it requires. To understand the difficulty, it will be useful
to anchor the discussion in some concrete problems:
1. Genetic modification of food has become a widespread practice.40 The risks of that practice are not known with any precision.4
Some people fear that genetic modification will result in serious
ecological harm and large risks to human health; others believe that
genetic modification will result in more nutritious food and significant improvements in human health.42
2. Scientists are not in accord about the dangers associated with
global warming, but there is general agreement that global warming
is in fact occurring. 43 It is possible that global warming will pro44
duce, by 2100, a mean temperature increase of 3.5 degrees Celsius
(the high-end estimate of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change),45 that it will result in $5 trillion or more in monetized
35.
See John D. Graham, Decision-Analytic Refinements of the PrecautionaryPrinciple,4 J. RISK
RES. 127 (2001).

36.
37.

Id.
Id.

38.

See Morris, supra note 16, at 17.

39.

Id.

40.

ALAN MCHUGHEN, PANDORA'S PICNIC BASKET (2000).

41.
42.
43.

Id. at 129-35.
Id. at 2-6.
For a general discussion regarding global warming, see RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE:

RISK AND RESPONSE (2004). See also LOMBORG, supra note 21; WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS & JOSEPH
BOYER, WARMING THE WORLD: ECONOMIC MODELS OF GLOBAL WARMING 168 (2000).
See LOMBORG, supra note 21, at 317; see also NORDHAUS & BOYER, supra note 43, at 74.
44.
45.
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, IPCC SPECIAL REPORT ON THE REGIONAL
IMPACTS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: AN ASSESSMENT OF VULNERABILITY 266 (Robert T. Watson et al. eds.,
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costs, 46 and that it will also produce a significant number of deaths
from malaria. The Kyoto Protocol would require most industrialized
nations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions to 92%-94% of 1990
levels.47 A great deal of work suggests that significant decreases in
such emissions would have large benefits, but skeptics contend that
the costs of such decreases would reduce the well-being of millions
of people, especially the poorest members of society.48
3. Many people fear nuclear power on the ground that nuclear
power plants create various health and safety risks, including some
possibility of catastrophe. 49 But if a nation does not rely on nuclear
power, it might well rely instead on fossil fuels, in particular on
coal-fired power plants. 50 Such plants create risks of their own, including risks associated with global warming. 51 China, for example,
has relied on nuclear energy in a way that reduces greenhouse gases
and a range of air pollution problems.5 2
4. In the first years of the twenty-first century, one of the most controversial environmental issues in the United States involved the
regulation of arsenic in drinking water. There is a serious dispute
over the precise level of risks posed by low levels of arsenic in water, but the "worst case" scenario predicts that over one hundred
lives might be lost each year, as a result of the 50 part per billion
standard that the Clinton Administration sought to revise.53 At the
same time, the proposed ten part per billion standard would cost
over $200 million each year, and it is possible that it would save as
few as six lives annually.54
In these cases, what kind of guidance is provided by the Precautionary
Principle? It is tempting to say, as is in fact standard, that the principle calls
1998), available at http:llwww.grida.no/climate/ipcc/regional/266.htm.
46.
See LOMBORG, supra note 21, at 317; see also NORDHAUS & BOYER, supra note 43, at 163.
47.
Beyond the PrecautionaryPrinciple,supra note 4, at 1021 (citing ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL.,
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 520-30 (3d ed. 2000)).

48.
See POSNER, supra note 43, at 165-71; see also LOMBORG, supra note 21, at 301-24;
NORDHAUS & BOYER, supra note 43, at 160-68.
49.
See Ling Zhong, Note, Nuclear Energy: China'sApproach Towards Addressing Global Warming, 12 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 493, 508 (2000). Of course, it is possible to urge that nations should
reduce reliance on either coal-fired power plants or nuclear power and move toward environmentally
preferred alternatives, such as solar power. See generally RENEWABLE ENERGY: POWER FOR A
SUSTAINABLE FUTURE (Godfrey Boyle ed., 1996); ALLAN COLLINSON, RENEWABLE ENERGY (1991);

Dan E. Arvizu, Advanced Energy Technology and Climate ChangePolicy Implications, 2 FLA. COASTAL
L.J. 435 (2001). But these alternatives pose feasibility and expense problems of their own. See
LOMBORG, supra note 21, at 118-48.
50.
See Zhong, supranote 49, at 502.
51.
Id. at 507.
52.
Id. at 494.
53.
See Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 Geo. L.J. 2255, 2258 (2002).
54.
Id.
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for strong controls on genetic engineering of food, on greenhouse gases, on
arsenic, and on nuclear power. In all of these cases, there is a possibility of
serious harm, and no authoritative scientific evidence demonstrates that the
possibility is close to zero. If the burden of proof is on the proponent of the
activity or processes in question, the Precautionary Principle would seem to
impose a burden of proof that cannot be met. Put aside the question of
whether the Precautionary Principle, understood to compel stringent regulation in these cases, is sensible. Let us ask a more fundamental question: Is
that more stringent regulation, therefore, compelled by the Precautionary
Principle?
The answer is that it is not. In some of these cases, it should be easy to
see that in its own way, stringent regulation would actually run afoul of the
Precautionary Principle. The simplest reason is that such regulation might
well deprive society of significant benefits, and hence, produce serious
harms that would otherwise not occur. In some cases, regulation eliminates
the "opportunity benefits" of a process or activity, and thus, causes preventable deaths.55 If this is so, regulation is hardly precautionary. Consider the
"drug lag" produced whenever the government takes a highly precautionary
56
approach to the introduction of new medicines and drugs onto the market.
If a government insists on such an approach, it will protect people against
harms from inadequately tested drugs, but it will also prevent people from
receiving potential benefits from those very drugs. Is it "precautionary" to
require extensive premarketing testing, or to do the opposite?
In the context of medicines to prevent AIDS, those who favor "precautions" have asked governments to reduce the level of premarketing testing,
precisely in the interest of health. As an aside, the United States is more
precautionary about new medicines than most European nations. But by
failing to allow such medicines on the market, the United States fails to take
precautions against the illnesses that could be reduced by speedier procedures.
Or consider the continuing debate over whether certain antidepressants
impose a (small) risk of breast cancer.57 A precautionary approach might
seem to caution against the use of such antidepressants because of their carcinogenic potential. But the failure to use those depressants might well impose risks of its own, certainly psychological and possibly even physical
risks (because psychological ailments are sometimes associated with physical ailments as well). Or consider the Soviet Union's decision to evacuate
and relocate more than 270,000 people in response to the risk of adverse
effects from the Chernobyl fallout. 58 It is not clear that on balance, this masSee AARON WILDAVSKY, SEARCHING FOR SAFETY 48-50 (1988).
See HENRY G. GRABOWSKI & JOHN M. VERNON, THE REGULATION OF PHARMACEUTICALS:
BALANCING THE BENEFITS AND RISKS 38-41 (1983).

55.
56.

See Judith P. Kelly et al., Risk of Breast CancerAccording to Use of Antidepressants, Phenothi57.
azines, and Antihistamines, 150 Am. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 861 (1999); C.R. Sharpe et al., The Effects of
Tricyclic Antidepressantson Breast CancerRisk, 86 BRIT. J. CANCER 92 (2002).
58.
Maurice Tubiana, Radiation Risks in Perspective: Radiation-Induced Cancer Among Cancer
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sive relocation project was justified on health grounds: "A comparison
ought to [have been] made between the psychological and medical burden[s] of this measure (anxiety, psychosomatic diseases, depression, and
suicides) and the harm that [may have been prevented]. 59 More generally, a
sensible government might want to ignore the small risks associated with
low levels of radiation on the ground that precautionary responses are likely
to cause fear that outweighs any health benefits from those responses.6 °
Or consider a more general question about how to handle low-level
toxic agents, including carcinogens. Do such agents cause adverse effects?
If we lack clear evidence, it might seem "precautionary" to assume that they
do and hence, to assume, in the face of uncertainty, that the dose-response
curve is linear and without safe thresholds.61 In the United States, this is the
default assumption of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).62 But is
this approach unambiguously precautionary? Considerable evidence suggests that many toxic agents that are harmful at high levels are actually
beneficial at low levels. 63 Thus, "hormesis" is a dose-response relationshiR
in which low doses stimulate desirable effects and high doses inhibit them.
When hormesis is involved, governmental use of a linear dose-response
curve, assuming no safe thresholds, will actually cause mortality and morbidity effects.
Which default approach to the dose-response curve is precautionary? To
raise this question is not to take a stand on whether some, many, or all toxic
agents are beneficial or harmful at very low doses. It is only to say that the
simultaneous possibility of benefits at low levels and of harms at low levels
makes the Precautionary Principle paralyzing. The principle requires use of
a linear, non-threshold model, but it simultaneously condemns the use of
that very model. For this and other reasons, it has been argued that the unreflective use of the Precautionary Principle threatens to increase rather than
decrease the risks associated with food.65
Or consider the genetic modification of food. Many people believe that
a failure to allow genetic modification might well result in numerous
deaths.66 The reason is that genetic modification holds out the promise of
Risks, 39 RADIATION & ENVTL. BIOPHYSICS 3, 8-10 (2000).
Id.
59.
60.
Id. For some counterevidence in an important context, see Lennart Hardell et al., Further Aspects on Cellular and Cordless Telephones and Brain Tumours, 22 INT'L. J. ONCOLOGY 399 (2003)
(discussing evidence of an association between cellular telephones and cancer).
For criticism of the linearity assumption, see Tubiana, supra note 58, at 8-9.
61.
62.
See National Primary Drinking Water Regulations, 66 Fed. Reg. 6976, 6994 (Jan. 22, 2001).
63.
See Edward J. Calabrese & Linda A. Baldwin, Hormesis: The Dose Response Revolution, 43
ANN. REv. PHARMACOLOGY TOXICOLOGY 175 (2003), availableat http://pharmtox.annualreviews.org/
cgi/reprint/43/l/175.pdf; Edward J. Calabrese & Linda A. Baldwin, The Hormetic Dose-Response Model
is More Common than the Threshold Model in Toxicology, 71 TOXICOLOGICAL SCI. 246 (2003), available at http://toxsci.oupjournals.org/cgi/reprint/7l/2/246.pdf.
64.
Calabrese & Baldwin, Hormesis, supra note 63, at 176-77.
65.
J.C. Hanekamp et al., Chloramphenicol,Food Safety, and PrecautionaryThinking in Europe, 6
ENVTL. LIABILITY 209 (2003).

66.

Beyond the PrecautionaryPrinciple, supra note 4, at 1023 (citing BILL LAMBRECHT, DINNER
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producing food that is both cheaper and healthier-resulting, for example,
in "golden rice," which might have large benefits in developing countries.6 7
My point is not that genetic modification will likely have those benefits, or
that the benefits of genetic modification outweigh the risks. The claim is
only that if the Precautionary Principle is taken literally, it is offended by
regulation as well as by nonregulation.
This example suggests that regulation sometimes violates the Precautionary Principle because it gives rise to substitute risks, in the form of hazards that materialize or are increased, as a result of regulation. 68 Consider
the case of DDT, often banned or regulated in the interest of reducing risks
to birds and human beings. The problem with such bans is that in poor nations they eliminate what appears to be the most effective way of combating
malaria-and thus significantly undermine public health. 69 Or consider the
EPA's effort to ban asbestos 7 0-a ban that might well seem justified or even
compelled by the Precautionary Principle. 7' The difficulty, from the standpoint of that very principle, is that substitutes for asbestos also carry risks.
The problem is pervasive. In the case of arsenic, the Administrator of the
EPA expressed concern that aggressive regulation, by virtue of its cost,
would lead people to cease using local water systems and rely on private
wells, which have high levels of contamination. 72 If this is so, stringent arsenic regulation violates the Precautionary Principle no less than lax regulation does. This is a common situation because opportunity benefits and substitute risks are the rule, not the exception.73
It is possible to go much further. A great deal of evidence suggests the
possibility that an expensive regulation can have adverse effects on life and
health. 74 It has been urged that a statistical life can be lost for every expenAT THE NEW GENE CAFt (2001)).

67.
See id. (citing LAMBRECHT, supranote 66, at 294-310).
68.
See the discussion of risk-related tradeoffs in JOHN GRAHAM & JONATHAN WIENER, RISK VS.
RISK (1995). See also Cass R. Sunstein, RISK AND REASON 133-52 (2002) (discussing how using regulation to prevent one health risk can give rise to another).
69.

See GoKLANY, supra note 23, at 13-27.

70.
See, e.g., Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991) (requiring EPA to
muster more evidence before it could completely ban manufacture, importation, processing, and distribution of asbestos).
71.
Id. at 1221 (noting that "many of the substitutes that ... will be used in the place of asbestos
have known carcinogenic effects").
72.
But we have seen instances, particularly in the West and Midwest, where arsenic is
naturally occurring at up to 700 and more parts per billion, where the cost of remediation has
forced water companies to close, leaving people with no way to get their water, save dig
wells. And then they are getting water that's even worse than what they were getting through
the water company.
Beyond the Precautionary Principle, supra note 4, at 1025 n.102 (Interview by Robert Novak & A]
Hunt, Evans, Novak, Hunt & Shields, with Christine Todd Whitman, Administrator, EPA on CNN
(April 21, 2001)).
73.
Note also that some regulation will have ancillary benefits by reducing risks other than those
that are specifically targeted. For a valuable discussion, see Samuel J. Rascoff & Richard L. Revesz, The
Biases of Risk TradeoffAnalysis, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1763 (2002).
74.

See Ralph Keeney, Mortality Risks Induced by Economic Expenditures, 10 RISK ANNAL. 147

(1990); Randall Lutter & John F. Morrall III, Health-Health Analysis: A New Way to Evaluate Health
and Safety Regulation, 8 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 43, 49 tbl. 1 (1994).
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diture of $7 million.7 5 One study suggests that an expenditure of $15 million
produces a loss of life.76 Another suggests that poor people are especially
vulnerable to this effect, indicating that a regulation that reduces wealth for
the poorest 20% of the population will have twice as large a mortality effect
as a regulation that reduces wealth for the wealthiest 20%. 7 To be sure,
both the phenomenon and the underlying mechanisms are disputed.78 I do
not mean to accept any particular amount here, or even to suggest that there
has been an unambiguous demonstration of an association between mortality and regulatory expenditures. The only point is that reasonable people
believe in that association. It follows that a multimillion dollar expenditure
for "precaution" has-as a worst case scenario-significant adverse health
effects, with an expenditure of $200 million leading to perhaps as many as
twenty to thirty lives lost.
This point makes the Precautionary Principle hard to implement, not
merely where regulation removes "opportunity benefits" or introduces or
increases substitute risks, but in any case in which the regulation costs a
significant amount. If this is so, the Precautionary Principle raises doubts
about many regulations. If the principle argues against any action that carries a small risk of imposing significant harm, we should be reluctant to
spend a lot of money to reduce risks, simply because those expenditures
themselves carry risks. In this sense, the Precautionary Principle, taken for
all that it is worth, is paralyzing: It stands as an obstacle to regulation and
nonregulation, and to everything in between.
It should now be easier to understand my earlier suggestion that, despite
its formal enthusiasm for the Precautionary Principle, European nations are
not "more precautionary" than the United States. Simply as a logical matter,
societies, like individuals, cannot be highly precautionary with respect to all
risks. Each society and each person must select certain risks for special attention. In these respects, the selectivity of precautions is not merely an
empirical fact, it is a conceptual inevitability. Comparing Europe to the
United States, Jonathan Wiener and Michael Rogers have demonstrated this
point empirically. 79 In the early twenty-first century, for example, the
United States appears to take a highly precautionary approach to the risks
associated with abandoned hazardous waste dumps and terrorism but not to
take a highly precautionary approach to the risks associated with global
warming, indoor air pollution, poverty, poor diet, and obesity. It would be
most valuable to determine which nations are especially precautionary with
respect to which risks and to explore changes over time.

75.

See Keeney, supra note 74.

76.

See ROBERT W. HAHN ET AL., Do FEDERAL REGULATIONS REDUCE MORTALITY? (2000).

See Kenneth S. Chapman & Govind Hariharan, Do Poor People Have a Stronger Relationship
77.
Between Income and Mortality Than the Rich? Implications of Panel Datafor Health-HealthAnalysis,
12 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 51, 58-63 (1996).

78.
79.

See Lutter & Morrall, supra note 74, at 43, 49 tbl. 1.
See Wiener & Rogers, supra note 9.
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A nation-by-nation study commissioned by the German Federal Environmental Agency goes so far as to conclude that there are two separate
camps in the industrialized world: "precaution countries" (Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the United States) and "protection countries" (Japan, France, and the United Kingdom). 80 But this conclusion seems to me
ludicrously implausible. The universe of risks is far too large to permit categorizations of this kind. The most general point is that no nation is precautionary in general and costly precautions are inevitably taken against only
those hazards that seem especially salient or insistent.8 1 The problem with
the Precautionary Principle is that it wrongly suggests that nations can and
should adopt a general form of risk aversion.
THE AVAILABILITY HEURISTIC
I suggest that the Precautionary Principle becomes operational if, and
only if, those who apply it wear blinders-only, that is, if they focus on
some aspects of the regulatory situation but downplay or disregard others.
But this suggestion simply raises an additional question: What accounts for
the particular blinders that underlie applications of the Precautionary Principle? Why is a person's attention selective, and why is it selective in the way
that it is? Why might different nations, with quite different policies, all believe that they are being precautionary? Many of these answers, I contend,
lie in an understanding of behavioral economics and cognitive psychology,
which provide important clues to cross-cultural differences in risk perception. The availabilityheuristic is the place to start.
It is well-established that in thinking about risks, people rely on certain
heuristics, or rules of thumb, which serve to simplify their inquiry. 82 Heuristics typically work through a process of "attribute substitution," in which
people answer a hard question by substituting an easier one.83 Should we be
fearful of nuclear power, terrorism, abduction of young children, mad cow
disease, contaminated blood, or pesticides? When people use the availability
heuristic, they assess the magnitude of risks by asking whether examples
can readily come to mind. 84 If people can easily think of such examples,
they are far more likely to be frightened than if they cannot. The availability
heuristic illuminates the operation of the Precautionary Principle, by showing why some hazards will be on-screen and why others will be neglected.

80.
81.
82.

See Sand, supranote 3, at 448.
For a demonstration of this point in Europe, see Vogel, supra note 2, at 570-71.
See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,

in JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY READER 35 (Hal R. Arkes et al. eds., 2d

ed. 2000).
83.
See Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited: Attribute Substitution
in Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 49, 53

(Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002).
84.
See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 82, at 42-46.
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The availability heuristic also tells us a great deal about differences in risk
perceptions across groups, cultures, and even nations.
For example, "a class whose instances are easily retrieved will appear
more numerous than a class of equal frequency whose instances are less
retrievable. 85 Consider a simple study where people are shown a list of
well-known people of both sexes and asked whether the list contained more
names of women or more names of men. 86 In lists in which the men were
especially famous, people thought that there were more names of men; in
lists in which the women
were more famous, people thought that there were
87
more names of women.
This is a point about how familiarity can affect the availability of instances. A risk that is familiar, like that associated with terrorism, will be
seen as more serious than a risk that is less familiar, like that associated with
sun-bathing. But salience is important as well. "For example, the impact of
seeing a house burning on the subjective probability of such accidents is
88
probably greater than the impact of reading about a fire in the local paper.
So too, recent events will have a greater impact than earlier ones. The point
helps explain differences across time and space in much risk-related behavior, including decisions to take precautions. Whether people will buy insurance for natural disasters is greatly affected by recent experiences.89 If
floods have not occurred in the immediate past, people who live on flood
plains are far less likely to purchase insurance. 9° In the aftermath of an
earthquake, insurance for earthquakes rises sharply-but it declines steadily
from that point, as vivid memories recede. 91 Note that the use of the
availability heuristic, in these contexts, is hardly irrational.92 Both insurance
and precautionary measures can be expensive, and what has happened
before seems, much of the time, to be the best available guide to what will
happen again. The problem is that the availability heuristic can lead to
serious errors in terms of both excessive fear and neglect.
What, in particular, produces availability? An intriguing essay attempts
to test the effects of the ease of imagery on perceived judgments of risk.93
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 43.
Id.
Id.
Id.

89.

See PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 40 (2000).

90.
See Howard Kunreuther, Mitigating DisasterLosses through Insurance, 12 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 171, 176-77 (1996).
91.
See id.
92.
Kahneman and Tversky emphasize that the heuristics they identify "are highly economical and
usually effective" but also that they "lead to systematic and predictable errors." Kahneman & Tversky,
supra note 82, at 55. Gerd Gigerenzer, among others, has emphasized that some heuristics can work
extremely well. See GERD GIGERENZER ET AL., SIMPLE HEURISTICS THAT MAKE Us SMART (1999);
GERD GIGERENZER, ADAPTIVE THINKING: RATIONALITY IN THE REAL WORLD (2000) (using this point

as a rejoinder to those who stress the errors introduced by heuristics and biases). I do not mean to take a
stand on the resulting debates. Even if many heuristics work well in daily life, a sensible government can
do much better than to rely on them.
93.
See Steven J. Sherman et al., Imagining Can Heighten or Lower the Perceived Likelihood of
Contracting a Disease: The Mediating Effect of Ease of Imagery, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE

HeinOnline -- 57 Ala. L. Rev. 88 2005-2006

2005]

Meador Lecture: Precautions Against What?

The study asked subjects to read about an illness (Hyposcenia-B) that "was
becoming increasingly prevalent" on the local campus. 94 In one condition,
the symptoms were concrete and easy to imagine-involving muscle aches,
low energy, and frequent, severe headaches.95 In another condition, the
symptoms were vague and hard to imagine, involving an inflamed liver, a
malfunctioning nervous system, and a general sense of disorientation.96
Subjects in both conditions were asked to imagine a three-week period in
which they had the disease and to write a detailed description of what they
imagined. After doing so, subjects were asked to assess, on a ten-point
scale, their likelihood of contracting the disease.97 The basic finding was
that likelihood judgments were very different in the two conditions, with
easily imagined symptoms making people far more inclined to believe that
they were likely to get the disease.98
The availability heuristic helps to explain the operation of the Precautionary Principle and cross-national differences for a simple reason: Sometimes a certain risk, said to call for precautions, is cognitively available;
whereas other risks, including those associated with regulation itself, are
not.99 In many cases where the Precautionary Principle seems to offer guidance, the reason is that some of the relevant risks are available while others
are barely visible. And if one nation is concerned with the risk of sunbathing and another is not, availability is likely to provide a large part of the
reason. Therefore, this is my central hypothesis: Differences across nations,
in the perception of risks, have a great deal to do with the operation of the
availability heuristic.
To be sure, those differences are also motivated in large part by actual
differences in risk levels. Fortunately, reality matters. Nations suffering
from high levels of malaria are likely to perceive malaria risks as far greater
than nations in which malaria is not a problem. Countries that face serious
risks from contaminated blood will probably show greater fear of contaminated blood than countries in which contaminated blood is not a problem.
But availability produces differences in perceptions that do not track differences in reality.
The study of cross-cultural risk perceptions remains in its infancy, 1 °
and hence, my claim must remain only a hypothesis that I cannot establish
to be true. What is necessary and what is lacking is comprehensive information about cross-cultural risk perceptions, allowing us to test the role of
availability. And we shall shortly see some complexities that bear on the

PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT, supra note 83.

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 99.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 101.
See Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 82, at 11.
See, e.g., Renn & Rorhmann, supra note 14, at 20.
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adequacy of the availability hypothesis. But for now, consider some supportive evidence:
1. Within the United States, public concern about risks usually
tracks changes in the actual fluctuations of those risks. But public
concern outruns actual fluctuations in the important case of "panics," bred by vivid illustrations that do not reflect changes in levels
of danger. 10 1 At certain points in the 1970s and 1980s, there were
extreme leaps in concern about teenage suicides, herpes, illegitimacy, and AIDS-leaps that did not correspond to changes in the
size of the problem. Availability, produced by "a particularly vivid
case or new finding that receives considerable media attention,"
played a major role in those leaps in public concern. 10 2 Sometimes
the concern led to unjustified precautions, as in the behavior of
some parents who refused to allow their children to attend classes
with students exhibiting signs of herpes.
2. Availability helps to explain the findings of a cross-national
study of perceptions of the risk associated with terrorism and
SARS.103 A study suggests that Americans perceived terrorism to be
a far greater threat, to themselves and to others, than SARS; Canadians perceived SARS to be a greater threat, to themselves and to
others, than terrorism. 1°4 Americans estimated their chance of serious harm from terrorism as 8.27%, about four times as high as their
estimated chance of serious harm from SARS (2.18%).105 Canadians estimated their chance of serious harm from SARS as 7.43%,
significantly higher than their estimate for terrorism (6.04%).06 Notably, the figures for SARS were unrealistically high, especially for
Canadians; the best estimate of the risk of contracting SARS, based
on Canadian figures, was .0008% (and the chance of dying as a result less than .0002%).107 For obvious reasons, the objective risks
from terrorism are much harder to calculate, but if it is estimated
that the United States will suffer at least one terrorist attack each
year with the same number of deaths as on September 11, the risk
unof death from terrorism is about .001%-a speculative number
10 8
start.
to
place
implausible
an
not
but
der the circumstances

101.

See George Loewenstein & Jane Mather, Dynamic Processes in Risk Perception,3 J. RISK &

UNCERTAINTY 155 (1990).

102.
Id. at 172.
103.
See Neal R. Feigenson et al., Perceptions of Terrorism and Disease Risks: A Cross-National
Comparison,69 Mo. L. REV. 991 (2004).
104.

Id.

105.

Id. at 998.

106.

Id.

107.
108.

Id. at 999.
Id. at 999-1000.
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The availability heuristic helps to account for these crossnational differences and for generally exaggerated risk perceptions.
In the United States, risks of terrorism have, to say the least, received a great deal of attention, producing a continuing sense of
threat. But there have been no incidents of SARS, and the media
coverage has been limited to events elsewhere-producing some
degree of salience but far lower than that associated with terrorism.
In Canada, the opposite is the case. The high degree of public discussion of SARS cases, accompanied by readily available instances,
produced an inflated sense of the numbers-sufficiently inflated to
exceed the same numbers from terrorism (certainly a salient risk in
Canada, as in most nations post 9/11).
3. What accounts for people's perception of their risk of being infected with HIV? Why are some people and some groups largely
unconcerned about that risk, while other people and groups are
highly focused on it? A study of rural Kenya and Malawi suggests
that availability plays a critical role.1°9 The authors found that risk
perception is a product of discussions that "are often provoked by
observing or hearing about an illness or death." 110 People "know in
the abstract how HIV is transmitted and how it can be prevented,"
but they are unclear "about the advisability and effectiveness of the
'
changes in sexual behavior that are recommended by experts."111
Perceptions of the risk of HIV transaction are very much a function
of social networks, with pronounced changes in belief and behavior
resulting from interactions with other people expressing a high level
of concern.' 1 2 The effects of social networks are thus asymmetric,
with substantial effects on those having "at least one network partner who is perceived to have a great deal of concern about
AIDS."'1 l 3 The authors do not refer explicitly to the availability
heuristic, but their findings are compatible with the suggestion that
with respect to AIDS, risk perceptions are produced by availability.
4. A study of Bulgaria and Romania concludes that differences in
levels of perceived risk "cannot be explained by differences in levels of real risk."'1 14 Indeed, the content of media is "a more potent

Social Networks, HIV/AIDS, and Risk Perceptions, (Penn. Inst.
109. See Jere R. Behrman et al.,
Econ. Res. Working Paper No. 03-007, Feb. 18, 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=382844.
110. Id.at10.
111.
Id.at18.
112. Id.at19.
113. Id.
Risk Perception inBulgaria and Romania, inCROSS-CULTURAL RISK
114. Lennart Sjoberg et al.,
PERCEPTION: A SURVEY OF EMPIRICAL STUDIES, supra note 14, at 147.
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determinant of perceived risk than real risk."' 1 5 Cultural variables
were not found to be crucial. In general, "perceived risk is a function of real risk and perhaps media' risk salience rather than culturally contingent values and beliefs." 16
5. There are many commonalities between the risk perceptions of
Americans and those of citizens of France." 7 But such differences
as there are have a great deal to do with availability. Hence, there is
far more concern in France with genetically engineered bacteria, a
risk with a high degree of publicity." 8 By contrast, Americans show
far more concern in the United States with coal-fired power plants,
radon in homes, and sun-tanning-three much-publicized sources
of risk.' 19
6. What accounts for the recent rise of precautionary thinking in
Europe? Why have certain environmental and health risks achieved
so much salience in England, France, and the European Union generally? A comprehensive study suggests that a few readily available
12
120
incidents played a large role. In the 1990s, a "wave of crises" '
involving food safety, namely mad cow disease, led to the deaths of
about one hundred people, with especially large effects on public attitudes.122 In a tribute to the operation of availability, "[t]he regulatory failure associated with BSE significantly affected the attitude
of the European public towards GM foods.' 2 3 An additional "scandal was the apparent failure of French government officials and
doctors to protect haemophiliacs [sic] from blood contaminated
with the AIDS . . . virus"'124 in a way that had large repercussions
for public opinion in France. 25 The conclusion is that differences
between European and American policies are not a product of deeprooted cultural distinctions, but instead, those differences have a
great deal to do with "widespread public perception of regulatory
failures," often based on particular, vivid, and widely salient
events. 126

115.

Id.

116.
117.

Id. at 178.
Paul Slovic et al., Nuclear Power and the Public: A Comparative Study of Risk Perception in

France and the United States, in CROSS-CULTURAL RISK PERCEPTION: A SURVEY OF EMPIRICAL
STUDIES, supra note 14, at 55.

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 74.
Id.
See Vogel, supra note 2.
Id.
at 568.
Id. at 568-69.
Id. at 569.
Id. at 570.
ld. at 570-71.
Id. at 580.
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SOCIAL INFLUENCES

Thus far, my emphasis has been on individual cognition. But to say the
least, the availability heuristic does not operate in a social vacuum. What is
readily "available" to some individuals, groups, cultures, and nations will
not be available to all. Within the United States, many of those who favor
gun control legislation have "available" a set of incidents in which such
legislation would have avoided unnecessary deaths; many of those who
reject such legislation are alert to incidents in which private gun ownership
allowed people to fend off criminal violence. 127 Obviously both government
and the media make some risks appear particularly salient. Consider President George W. Bush's plea: "Imagine those 19 hijackers [involved in the
9/11 attacks] with other weapons and other plans-this time armed by Saddam Hussein. It would take one vial, one canister, one crate slipped into this
country to bring a day of horror like none we have ever known." 128 Environmentalists, both in and out of government, operate in the same way, focusing public attention on potentially catastrophic harms. Well-organized,
private groups play a central role in activating public concern.
The question suggests the need to attend to the social and cultural dimensions of fear and risk perception. In many cases of high-visibility, lowprobability dangers, such as sniper attacks, shark attacks, contaminated
blood, and the kidnapping of young girls, the sources of availability are not
obscure. The mass media focus on those risks; people communicate their
fear and concern to one another; the widespread fact of fear and concern
increases media attention; the spiral continues until people move on. Hence,
the "risk of the month" syndrome, familiar in many societies, stems from
the interaction between availability and social influences.
Most of the time, however, what is available and salient to some is not
available and salient to all. For example, many of those who endorse the
Precautionary Principle focus on cases in which the government failed to
regulate some environmental harm, demanding irrefutable proof, with the
consequence being widespread illness and death. To such people, the available incidents require strong precautions in the face of uncertainty. But
many other people, skeptical of the Precautionary Principle, focus on cases
in which the government overreacted to weak science, causing large expenditures for little gain in terms of health or safety. To such people, the available incidents justify a measure of restraint in the face of uncertainty. Which
cases will be available and to whom?
In any case, people and cultures have different predispositions. These
predispositions play a large role in determining which, of the numerous
possibilities, is salient. If you are predisposed to be fearful of genetic modiSee Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion:A Cultural Theory of
127.
Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1291, 1299 (2003).
President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 28, 2003), transcript available at
128.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html).
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fication of food, you are more likely to seek out and recall incidents in
which genetic modification was said to cause harm. If you are predisposed
to fear electromagnetic fields, you will pay attention to apparent incidents in
which electromagnetic fields have produced an elevated incidence of cancer. If you are predisposed to believe that most media scares are false or
trumped-up, you will find cases in which public fears have been proved
baseless. These are examples of individual predispositions, but undoubtedly
cultural forces, some deep and some less so, help account for differences
across nations.
Availability helps to determine beliefs, to be sure, but beliefs help to determine availability as well. Both beliefs and availability are endogenous to
one another. When social and cultural forces interact with salience to produce concern about one set of problems but not another, predispositions are
crucial. It is in this sense that availability can be a product of forces that
must be explained independently. But let us now turn to how availability
spreads.
CASCADES

Sometimes availability and salience are produced through social bandwagons or cascades, in which apparently representative anecdotes and gripping examples move rapidly from one person to another. 29 Consider a stylized example. Andrew hears of a dangerous event, which he finds to be revealing or illustrative. (The event might involve crime, terrorism, pesticides,
environmental hazards, or threats to national security.) Andrew tells Barry,
who would be inclined to see the event as not terribly informative, but who,
learning of Andrew's reaction, comes to believe that the event does indeed
reveal a great deal and that a serious threat exists. Carol would tend to discount the risk, but once she hears of the shared opinion of Andrew and
Barry, she is frightened as well. Deborah will have to have a great deal of
private information to reject what has become the shared opinion of Andrew, Barry, and Carol. 130 Stylized though it is, the example shows that
once several people start to take an example as probative, many people may
be influenced by their opinion, giving rise to cascade effects. Cultural and
even national differences can be explained partly in this way.
Among doctors dealing with risks and precautions, cascades are common. "Most doctors are not at the cutting edge of research; their inevitable
reliance upon what colleagues have done or are doing leads to numerous

129.
Chip Heath et al., Emotional Selection in Memes: The Case of Urban Legends, 81 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1028 (2001); Chip Heath, Do People Prefer to Pass Along Good or
Bad News? Valence and Relevance as Predictors of Transmission Propensity, 68 ORGANIZATIONAL
BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 79 (1996).

130.
See David Hirschleifer, The Blind Leading the Blind: Social Influence, Fads, and Informational
Cascades, in THE NEW ECONOMICS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR 188, 193-94 (Mariano Tommasi & Kathryn
lerulli eds., 1995).
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surgical fads and treatment-caused illnesses ... .,,131 Thus, an article in the
prestigious New England Journal of Medicine explores "bandwagon diseases," in which doctors act like "lemmings, episodically and with a blind
infectious enthusiasm pushing certain diseases and treatments primarily
because everyone else is doing the same."' 132 Some medical practices, including tonsillectomy, "seem to have been adopted initially based on weak
information," and extreme differences in tonsillectomy frequencies (and
133
other procedures) provide good evidence that cascades are at work.
Cross-cultural differences in medical practices can be explained in significant part through this route.
A distinctive feature of social cascades is that the people who participate in them are simultaneously amplifying the very social signal by which
they are being influenced. By their very participation, those who join the
cascade increase its size, making it more likely that others will join too.
Unfortunately, cascades can lead people in mistaken directions, with a few
"early movers" spurring social fear that does not match reality. In the previous example, Andrew is having a large influence on the judgments of the
group, even though he may not, in fact, have accurate information about the
relevant event. Barry, Carol, and Deborah might have some information of
their own, perhaps enough to show that there is little reason for concern.
Still, unless they have a great deal of confidence in what they do, they are
likely to follow those who preceded them. The irony is that if most people
are following others, then little information is provided by the fact that some
or many seem to share a certain fear. Most are responding to the signals
provided by others, unaware that those others are doing exactly the same
thing. Of course corrections might well come eventually, but sometimes
they are too late.
In the domain of risks and precautions, "availability cascades" are responsible for many social beliefs. 134 A salient event, affecting people because it is available, tends to be repeated, leading to cascade effects, as the
event becomes available to increasingly large numbers of people. The point
is amplified by the fact that fear-inducing accounts, with high emotional
valence, are especially likely to spread. 35 There is a general implication
here. Because different social influences can be found in different communities, local variations are inevitable, with different examples becoming
salient in each. Hence, such variations-between New York and Ohio, or
England and the United States, or Germany and France-might involve
coincidence or small, random factors, rather than large-scale cultural differ131.
Id. at 204.
132.
John F. Bumrnam, Medical Practice a laMode: How Medical Fashions Determine Medical
Care, 317 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1220, 1222 (1987).
133.
Sushil Bikhchandani et al., Learning from the Behavior of Others: Conformity, Fads, and
Informational Cascades, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 151, 167 (1988).
134.
See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 683,683 (1999).
135.
See Heath et al., supra note 129.
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ences. Different judgments within different social groups, with different
"available" examples, owe their origin to social processes of this sort. Indeed the different reactions to nuclear power in France and the United
States can be explained in large part in this way. And when some groups
concentrate on cases in which guns increased violence, and others on cases
in which guns decreased violence, availability cascades are a large part of
the reason. Return to my epigraph: "Many Germans believe that drinking
water after eating cherries is deadly; they also believe that putting ice in soft
drinks is unhealthy. The English, however, rather enjoy a cold136drink of water after some cherries, and Americans love icy refreshments."'
GROUP POLARIZATION

There is a closely related phenomenon. When like-minded people deliberate with one another, they typically end up accepting a more extreme version of the views with which they began. 37 This is the process known as
group polarization.Consider a few examples:
D After discussion, citizens of France become more critical138of the
United States and its intentions with respect to economic aid.
* A group of moderately pro-feminist women becomes more
39
strongly pro-feminist after discussion. 1
* After discussion, whites predisposed to show racial prejudice offer more negative responses to the question of whether white racism
is responsible for conditions faced by African-Americans in Ameri14°
can cities.

* After discussion, whites predisposed not to show racial prejudice
offer more positive responses to the same question, that is, they are
more likely to find white prejudice to be the source
of conditions
141
faced by African-Americans in American cities.

136.
See Henrich et al., supra note 1, at 353. See id. at 353-54 (an entertaining outline in connection
with food choice decisions).
137.
See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT (2003).
138.
ROGER BROWN, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE SECOND EDITION 224 (1986).
139.
See David G. Myers, Discussion-Induced Attitude Polarization, 28 HUM. REL. 699, 707-12
(1975).
140.
BROWN, supra note 138, at 224 (discussing David G. Myers & George D. Bishop, The Enhancement of Dominant Attitudes in Group Discussion, 20 J.PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 386
(1971)).
141.
Id.
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* Juries inclined to award punitive damages typically produce
awards that are significantly higher than
42 the awards chosen, before
deliberation, by their median member. 1
Group polarization will inevitably occur in the context of perceptions of
risk; hence, group polarization helps to account for cultural and even national differences. If several people fear global warming or terrorism and
speak to one another, their fear is likely to increase as a result of internal
discussions. If other people believe that nuclear power is probably safe,
their belief to that effect will be fortified after they speak with one another,
to the point where they will believe that nuclear power is no reason for concern. If some groups seem hysterical about certain risks, and other groups
treat those risks as nonexistent, group polarization is likely to be a reason.
Hence, group polarization provides another explanation for the different
fears of groups, localities, and even nations. Internal discussions can make
Berliners fearful of risks that do not bother New Yorkers, and vice-versa; so
too, the citizens of London may fear a supposed danger that does not much
bother the citizens of Paris-even if the danger is no greater in the former
than in the latter.
Group polarization undoubtedly occurs in connection with the availability heuristic. Suppose, for example, that several people are discussing mad
cow disease, or a recent wave of sniper attacks, or cases involving the kidnapping of young girls, or situations in which the government has wrongly
ignored a serious foreign threat. If particular examples are mentioned, they
are likely to prove memorable. And if the group has a predisposition to
think that one or another risk is serious, social dynamics will lead the group
to believe that the example is highly revealing. An initial predisposition
toward fear is likely to be aggravated after collective deliberations. Within
groups, a tendency toward fear breeds its own amplification.
Consider in this light the 2004 report of the United States Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, which contended the Central Intelligence
Agency's (CIA) predisposition to find a serious threat from Iraq led it to fail
to explore alternative possibilities or to obtain and use the information that
it actually held. 143 Falling victim to group polarization in the particular context of fear, the CIA showed a "tendency to reject information that contradicted the presumption that Iraq" had weapons of mass destruction. 144 This
claim is a remarkable echo of one that followed the 2003 investigation of
failures at NASA, in which the Columbia Accident Investigation Board
explicitly attributed the accident to NASA's unfortunate culture, one that

142.

See CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES: How JURIES DECIDE (2002).
SELECT S. COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 108th CONG., REPORT ON THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY'S PREWAR INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS ON IRAQ, CONCLUSIONS, (Comm. Print 2004),

143.

available at http://intelligence.senate.gov/conclusions.pdf.
144.
Id. at6.
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145
does too little to elicit14information.
In the Board's words, NASA lacks
"checks and balances" 6 and pressures people to follow a "party line., 147

The result was a process of polarization that led to a dismissal of serious
risks.
MEDIA, INTEREST GROUPS, AND POLITICIANS

It should be clear that in the real world, some voices are more important
than others, especially when availability and salience are involved. In particular, the behavior and preoccupations of the media play a large role.
Many perceived "epidemics" are in reality no such thing, but instead a
product of media coverage of gripping, unrepresentative incidents. Attention to those incidents is likely to ensure availability and salience, promoting an inaccurately high estimate of probability and, at the same time, some
degree of probability neglect. In the face of close media attention, the demand for legal responses will be significantly affected. Changes within and
even across nations are a natural result.
Knowing the importance of media coverage, well-organized private
groups work extremely hard to promote public attention concerning particular risks. Some of these groups are altruistic; others are entirely selfinterested. The common tactic is to publicize an incident that might trigger
both availability and salience. Terrorists themselves are the most extreme
and vicious example, using high-visibility attacks to convince people that
"they cannot be safe anywhere." But many illustrations are less objectionable and sometimes even benign. In the United States, consider the abandoned hazardous waste at Love Canal, used to promote hazardous waste
cleanup, 148 or the Exxon Valdez disaster, used by the Sierra Club and other
environmental organizations to promote more stringent safeguards against
oil spills. 149 Showing at least a working knowledge of the availability heuristic, private groups seize on selected incidents and publicize them to make
them generally salient to the public. In all of these examples, the use of particular instances might be necessary to move the public and legislatures in
the right directions. Certainly the social processes that interact with salience
and availability can promote reform where it is needed. But there is no assurance here, particularly if social influences are leading people to exaggerate a problem or to ignore the question of probability altogether.
Politicians engage in the same basic project. By its very nature, the
voice of an influential politician comes with amplifiers. When public officials bring an incident before the public, a seemingly illustrative example is
145.
COLUMBIA ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BD., NAT'L AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMIN., REPORT
ON THE COLUMBIA ACCIDENT (2003), available at http://anon.nasa-global. speedera.net/anon.nasaglobal/CAIB/CAIB-lowresfull.pdf.

146.

Id. at 12.

147.
148.
149.

Id. at 102.
See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 134, at 691-98.
Id. at 733.

HeinOnline -- 57 Ala. L. Rev. 98 2005-2006

2005]

Meador Lecture: Precautions Against What?

likely to spread far and wide. A legal enactment can itself promote availability; if the law responds to the problems associated with hazardous waste
dumps or "hate crimes," people might well come to see those problems as
readily available. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 would inevitably loom large no matter what President George W. Bush chose to emphasize. But the President, and his White House generally, referred to the attacks on countless occasions, frequently as a way of emphasizing the reality
of seemingly distant threats and the need to incur significant costs to counteract them (including the 2003 Iraq war, itself fueled by presidential
speeches including vivid narratives of catastrophic harm). There is no doubt
that the salience of these attacks played a large role in affecting political
behavior and that this role cannot be understood without reference to social
influences. The implications for cultural differences should be clear, If leaders in different nations draw attention to different risks, there will be largescale differences in risk perceptions.
PREDISPOSITIONS AND CULTURE

But all this does not provide the full picture. Beliefs and orientations are
a product of availability, and social influences ensure both availability and
salience. But as I have suggested, what is available is also a product of antecedent beliefs and orientations, both individual and social. In other words,
availability is endogenous to, or a product of, predispositions, individual,
cultural, and
national. A great deal of further work remains to be done on
150
this topic.
Why do some people recall and emphasize incidents in which a failure
to take precautions led to serious environmental harm? A likely reason is
that they are predisposed to favor environmental protection. And why do
some people recall and emphasize incidents in which environmental protection led to huge costs for little gain? A likely reason is that they are predisposed to oppose environmental controls. Here is an interaction between the
availability heuristic and confirmation bias: "[Tlhe tendency [is] to seek to
confirm our original hypotheses and beliefs,"1' 51 a tendency that reviewers
have found in the judgments of both the CIA and NASA.152 Confirmation
bias plays a large role in different risk perceptions across individuals and
groups. If members of a culturally distinct group are predisposed to believe
that new technologies are risky, or that genetically modified organisms are
hazardous, or that cell phones produce cancer, apparently supportive illustrations will be memorable, and contrary ones will be discounted.
150. For an influential treatment of culture see MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND
CULTURE (1984); a natural reading of work done and inspired by Douglas and Wildavsky is that availability is a product of cultural orientations, rather than vice-versa. But for a contrasting view, see Vogel,
supra note 2.
151.
ELLIOTT ARONSON,THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 146, 147 (1991).
152.
See COLUMBIA ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BD., supra note 145; see SELECT S. COMM. ON
INTELLIGENCE, supra note 143.
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Of course predispositions are not a black box, and they do not come
from the sky. They have sources. Among their sources are availability and
salience. After incidents of mad cow disease in England, many Europeans
lost trust in the relevant authorities and acquired a predisposition to fear and
to take precautions and urge precautions against, associated and analogous
threats. In Europe, the growth of precautionary thinking, across certain domains, had a great deal to do with particular salient incidents.' 53 Hence,
there is a complex set of interactions, with heuristics helping to constitute
predispositions, which are in turn responsible for the real-world operation of
heuristics. All this happens socially, not merely individually; predispositions are not static. When people are in a group that is predisposed in a particular direction, the salient examples will be quite different from those that
are salient in a group with an opposite predisposition. Here, group polarization is especially important. What is sometimes described as "culture," or as
deep-rooted "cultural differences," may be no such thing. Cascade effects
and polarization, interacting with availability, can be responsible for inclinations and variations that might well have taken another form.
On the other hand, different cultural orientations can play a large role in
determining what turns out to be available. For example, the United States
is highly diverse, and for some purposes, it is plausible to think of different
regions and groups as having different cultures. Within African-American
communities, the available instances are sometimes quite different from
those that can be found within all-white communities. Across nations, the
differences are even more striking, in part, because different worldviews
play such a dominant role. And what is true for individuals is true for nations as well. Just as predispositions are, in part, a function of availability,
so too availability is, in part, a function of predispositions. Social influences
operate at both levels, affecting what is available and also moving predispositions in one or another direction. The problem is that both individuals and
societies may be fearful of nonexistent or trivial risks-and simultaneously
neglect real dangers.
CONCLUSION

In this Lecture I have ventured a conceptual claim and a psychological
hypothesis. The conceptual claim is that it is not possible to be "precautionary" in general. An individual or a nation can take precautions against particular risks, to be sure, but no individual or nation can be precautionary as a
general proposition. The reason is that risks are on all sides of social situations. If a state purports to be precautionary, it is almost certainly taking
steps that create risks of their own. The point certainly holds for aggressive
regulation of the genetic modification of food and greenhouse gases; it also
holds for preemptive wars.
153.

See Vogel, supra note 2.
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The psychological hypothesis is that the operation of the Precautionary
Principle, the differences in risk perception among nations, have a great deal
to do with the availability heuristic. If people can think of cases in which a
risk has come to fruition, they are far more likely to think that the risk
should be taken seriously. "Availability bias," in the form of excessive fear,
and "unavailability bias," in the form of unjustified neglect, are unfortunate
results. All cultures suffer from both of these, but they suffer from them in
different ways, because what is available in one culture is often less available, or unavailable, in others.
Of course, availability is a product of social influences. Cascade effects
and group polarization play substantial roles in making one or another incident available to many or most. There are multiple equilibria here: It is
hardly inevitable that SARS would have great salience in Canada but not in
the United States. Single incidents and small shocks can make an extraordinary difference. Moreover, what is available to some will not be available to
all-in part-because of social influences, and in part because of individual,
cultural, and national predispositions. I have emphasized that some cultures
will find some risks "available," not because of simple facts, but because
the relevant citizens are predisposed to focus on some risks but not on others.
I believe that the availability heuristic provides many clues about the
operation of the Precautionary Principle and cross-cultural risk perceptions.
But a great deal of empirical work remains to be done, not least in exploring
the complex interactions among individual cognition, cascade effects, the
behavior of those who spread information, and cultural predispositions.
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